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The Course of Industrial Development Influencing Smallholder Farmers' Peace in the Face of Structural and Cultural Violence: The Case of Lume District, Oromia, Ethiopia

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Abstract

This study aimed to uncover the structural and cultural violence that happens in the course of industrial development and affects farmers' peace in Lume District, East Shawa Zone, Oromia, Ethiopia. The case study design and primary data were used in this investigation. Data were gathered through in-depth and key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and desk reviews and then thematically analyzed. The findings of the study revealed that in the course of industrial development, smallholder farmers were exposed to structural and cultural violence due to inbuilt little concern given for the rights, security, and economic survival of the farmers hosting the industry sector. The course of industrial development in Ethiopia, in general, and in Lume District in particular, defies what development as a concept entails and follows an exclusionary and destructive approach when it comes to the overall well-being of smallholder farmers. Development being used as a pretext for exploitation stands against what development is supposed to bring economically to the farmers, ultimately exposing them to violent conflict. To address the security issues facing the farming community, it is necessary to reexamine the structural and cultural violence ingrained in the unjust course of industrial development that violates smallholder farmers' fundamental human, economic, civil, environmental, and security rights.

Keywords: Industrial development; smallholder farmers; structural and cultural violence; peace

L'influence du développement industriel sur la paix des petits exploitants agricoles face à la violence structurelle et culturelle : le cas du district de Lume, Oromia, Éthiopie

Résumé

Cette étude vise à mettre en évidence la violence structurelle et culturelle qui se produit au cours du développement industriel et qui affecte la paix des agriculteurs dans le district de Lume, zone East Shawa, à Oromia, en Éthiopie. L'enquête a été menée sur la base d'une étude de cas et de données primaires. Les données ont été recueillies au moyen d'entretiens approfondis et avec des informateurs clés, de discussions de groupe et d'examens documentaires, puis analysées thématiquement. Les résultats de l'étude ont révélé qu'au cours du développement industriel, les petits exploitants agricoles ont été exposés à une violence structurelle et culturelle. Cela est dû au peu d'intérêt accordé à leurs droits, à leur sécurité et à la survie économique des agriculteurs qui hébergent le secteur industriel. L'évolution du développement industriel en Éthiopie, en général, et dans le district de Lume en particulier, va à l'encontre de ce que le concept de développement implique et suit une approche excluante et destructrice en ce qui concerne le bien-être général des petits exploitants agricoles. Le développement est utilisé comme prétexte pour que l'exploitation s'oppose à ce que le développement est censé apporter économiquement aux agriculteurs, les exposant finalement à des conflits violents. Pour résoudre les problèmes de sécurité auxquels est confrontée la communauté agricole, il est nécessaire de réexaminer la violence structurelle et culturelle enracinée dans le cours injuste du développement industriel qui viole les droits humains, économiques, civils, environnementaux et de sécurité fondamentaux des petits exploitants agricoles.

Mots-clés : développement industriel, petits exploitants agricoles, violence structurelle et culturelle, paix

1.0 Introduction

The contribution of the rural farming community to the global economy is crucial for the sustainability of the world. Globally, rural agricultural people rely on small-scale farming as a source of survival (Ricciardi et al., 2018; Touch et al., 2024). It contributes 70–80% to world (Ricciardi et al., 2018), African (Kamara et al., 2019), and Ethiopian (Gebre-Selassie & Bekele, 2012; Haile et al., 2022) food security. Being practiced by most of the agricultural communities in Ethiopia, small-scale farming accounts for 95% of total agriculture and covers more than 90% of total agricultural output (Gebre-Selassie & Bekele, 2012; Haile et al., 2022). Hence, structural and cultural marginalization of small-scale farmers by the name of development not only threatens their peace but also threatens the peace of the majority who globally rely on them for food by compromising food security which, in the meantime, is known to lead to violent conflict.

Industry-based economic development, which follows capitalist policies, exposed agriculturally dominated developing nations to economic hardship due to structural

and cultural violence; hence, most of them have been going through deindustrialization (Gebreeyesus, 2014; Oqubay, 2018). In developing countries, this sector of development that is very violent follows a very specific package of capitalist policies for the expansion of the global economy into new frontiers. In the birth of development, it was imagined that the less developed world must embrace the culture of civilized society in all its forms, including their violent development policies (Sarkar, 2005). While investors from the developed world went to the developing world embracing capitalist exclusionary policies, investors and states in the developing world covertly or overtly adopted the policies and engaged in pillaging their people against their values, culture, rights, and needs. Some political elites of developing nations go to the extent of plundering their people, being with the greedy capitalists in the developed world (Rodney, 1973).

A number of variables adopted from exclusionary capitalist notions of developing the undeveloped countries challenged development in general and industry-based development in particular in developing nations. Among these, structural violence like the exclusion of underprivileged people in the political culture of development and cultural violence like low human value or cheap labor forces that prioritize material gain over humans can be mentioned (Ojukwu et al., 2017). All these affect the peace of the citizens in the Third World, including smallholder farmers, as they are ingrained in the political economic history of the developing states in one way or another. Moreover, governments in several developing countries have prioritized the growth of the manufacturing sector in their pursuit of industrialization, at the expense of the agricultural sector (Takeuchi, 2010), merely influenced by the capitalist cultural violence that industrialization is better, or more efficient, or more developed than small-scale agriculture. This structural and cultural violence has caused a stagnation of economic growth or an increase in poverty in rural areas, and conflict and tension where most people work in agriculture.

Ethiopia is one of the developing countries, and its process of industrial development is no exception. In Ethiopia there is a culture of viewing poverty eradication as a matter of survival by the state, which is practically rational. However, this serves as a cultural violence to unjustly securitize development to extraordinarily combat any complaints, claims, and quests, whether legal or illegal, against its exclusionary practice (Gebresenbet, 2014). This cultural violence promotes structural violence by empowering state agents to marginalize part of the citizenry, particularly the farming community, from the political economy arena.

Development-induced cultural and structural violence is known to cause security challenges in Ethiopia. According to Debela et al. (2020) and Gemeda et al. (2023), large-scale industrial investments in Ethiopia that structurally neglected smallholder farmers and transferred large tracts of land to investors with little or no compensation brought (a) significant land use changes, (b) the appropriation of agricultural land, (c) an increase in the number of landless, (d) joblessness and loss of means of subsistence, and (e) tensions. Among other reasons, this sparked Oromo demonstrations (2014–2017), which caused thousands of fatalities and tens of thousands of terrible human rights abuses (Carboni, 2016; Grant & Das, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Tura, 2018) which affected the study area as well. This is the result of capitalist violent development policies historically built into state-building policies and practices that envisioned farmers, 85% of citizens, as a frontier that needed the intervention of the state.

Many studies have been conducted in Ethiopia on industry-related repercussions, including legal and practical challenges and impacts. Gebreeyesus (2014) conducted a study on a natural experiment of industrial policy focusing on floriculture and the metal and engineering industries in Ethiopia. Gebreeyesus (2016) studied industrial policy and development in Ethiopia, and Oqubay (2018) also conducted a study on industrial policy and late industrialization in Ethiopia. However, none of these three authors focused on the impacts of industrial development on smallholder farmers' peace from the point of view of structural and cultural violence, which makes our study different from them conceptually and theoretically.

The objective of our study was to elucidate the structural and cultural violence that has been built in the course of industrial development in Ethiopia in general and East Shawa Zone, Lume District, in particular, that has been threatening the tranquility of the smallholder farmers. The argument is that how development has been envisioned, framed, and executed in Ethiopia and the cultural and structural violence embedded in it are among the reasons for the conflict dynamics in Ethiopia. In this regard, it is worthwhile to mention the Oromo protest caused by the economic marginalization of the Oromo farmers that cost many lives and resources (Grant & Das, 2015; Tura, 2018).

2.0. The Context: Industrialization and Development Trajectories in Ethiopia

As a developing nation, Ethiopia is not an exception to norms when it comes to industrial development. With its limited scope, technological standard, and contribution to economic development, the industrial sector in Ethiopia, just like in other developing nations, has had a multifaceted impact on the local communities. Pollution, extensive land grabbing for industry and other development activities with little or no compensation (Abate, 2019; Belda et al., 2024; Gemeda et al., 2023), and the miserable life under investors (Gurmu et al., 2017) triggered massive protests in Oromia from 2014 to 2017 (Carboni, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016), which affected the study area as well (Belda et al., 2024). Despite their contribution to the whole national economy, local agricultural communities in Ethiopia have been marginalized politically, economically, environmentally, and socially in the development of industry (Mukasa et al., 2017).

Exclusionary development—industrialization—practice in Ethiopia has to do with how the essence of development had been framed in the political history of the state's development, which is an extension of the exploitative development framework of the capitalist world system. Land, which is a means of livelihood for 85% of the population in the country (Debela et al., 2020), had been grabbed by the political elites and their agents in the name of development. Land grabbing in the name of development is built in history, rooted in society, and practiced in the political culture of the state starting from the late 19th century state building, overwhelming the southern and eastern in the south–north dichotomy (Markakis, 2011), just like the exclusionary capitalist order in the new frontier in the Global South. The present exclusionary development and industrialization in Ethiopia are reminiscent of eminent pictures from the imperial conquest in the late 1880s and early 1900s. In those periods, military authorities and feudal lords forcefully ruled over land, dominating the environment in the south and driving out indigenous peoples in the name of frontier development (Abate, 2019).

Similar to Western maldevelopment practice in the less developed world (Ghosh, 2019), in Oromia, exclusionary development practice, including mal-industrialization in the name of frontier development—developing underutilized, underdeveloped, and uncivilized space that needs the intervention of the state for proper utilization, civilization, and development (Hindeya, 2018; Markakis, 2011)—is a phenomenon that has been used for a long time. In short, development is a strategy used to grab and commodify land and marginalize smallholders in the course of industrial development in Ethiopia in general and Oromia in particular. Thus, our study seeks to explain the ways in which the tranquility of smallholder farmers is compromised by the historically ingrained cultural and structural violence.

3.0 Unfolding Peace-development Nexus

Development is manifested differently in different sects of the people: whereas it is detrimental to the structurally unprivileged people, it is beneficial to the privileged. Its correlation with peace also has to do with this line of construction.

For Popovski (2019), development and peace are inseparable phenomena in human life. Referring to Galtung, Popovski (2019) states the interdependence of peace and development.

> Thus, 'peace' and 'development' become two ways of saying the same thing, with different emphasis rather than different conceptualizations. … They are two sides of the same coin. … If development is to build, then violence is to destroy; hence violence is antidevelopment. If peace is the opposite of violence, then peace must have much in common with development. Hence, power (over others) and violence are on one side, and development and peace on the other (p. 52).

According to this scholar, being on one side, peace and development overlap in addressing social issues such as justice, equality, freedom, poverty reduction, property rights, and impartiality, and a lack of these social elements due to one result in the deficiency of the other, leading to violence.

However, development, which was believed to address human needs and peace for the Global South after the colonial period, was soon proven to be much more problematic than initially promised due to the violent global economic systems (Acosta, 2013; Escobar, 1995; Esteva et al., 2013; Kothari & Harcourt, 2022). It is inherently characterized by marginalization against the underprivileged people, particularly those in the Global South (Escobar, 1995). Thus, contrary to the discourse of developing the less developed, it produced massive underdevelopment, impoverishment, and untold exploitation (Acosta, 2013; Escobar, 1995; Rodney, 1973). Thus, development-induced structural violence established based on the North-South dichotomy and cultural violence that one style fits all disrupted and ruined the sources of life and peace on the planet: the lands, forests, air, and water systems that we rely on (Kothari & Harcourt, 2022). This, in one way or another, influences the course of industrial development and its impact on the hosting community's peace and security, particularly on the poor in the Global South and in every state.

4.0 Structural and Cultural Violence

Structural violence is a concept associated with John Galtung in peace studies. He initiated the idea in 1969 in an attempt to give a more thorough and precise understanding of what peace was (De Maio & Ansell, 2018). He laid the groundwork for the interaction of peace and violence. According to Galtung, structural violence inhibits positive peace—true and perpetual peace (Galtung, 1969, 2018). "Peace also has two sides: absence of personal violence, and absence of structural violence. We shall refer to them as negative peace and positive peace respectively" (Galtung, 1969, p. 183; 2018, p. 51). This approach of Galtung enriched the comprehensive understanding of peace by becoming a core and fruitful tool in peace research by exposing the harm caused by invisible-actor-oriented violence (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016), unlike in the case of personal direct violence (Galtung, 1969; Ho, 2007; Taylor, 2013).

Violence has been an essential part of the development discourse from its start (Escobar, 1995) and is inherent in present developmental processes (Kothari & Harcourt, 2022). "Violence is inbuilt in the continuing processes of industrialization and urbanization as they destroy livelihoods in addition to neglecting rural areas" (Kothari & Harcourt, 2022, p. 4). Again, Kothari and Harcourt (2022) as well as Alexander (2019) showed that development-induced violence destroys the environment and culture, and excludes, exploits, discriminates against, and marginalizes segments of a society from political, economic, and social benefits, which gave structural violence an important attention in development. This showed that violence is an aspect of development, particularly industrialization, that hurts peace nonviolently.

Structural violence is avoidable harm (Galtung, 1969; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016). It is unequal power, injustice, and inequality ingrained in the dominant group's political, economic, cultural, and psychological structure and used as a social apparatus of exploitation and oppression. It leads to unequal livelihoods (Gellner, 2017; Ho, 2007; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016), "epic poverty and inequality" (Saussy, 2010, p. 293), and "social suffering" (Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016, p. 46). It is regarded as a double-edged knife used as both the source and the result of violent conflict (Reardon & Snauwaert, 2015). Structural violence is as harmful as direct physical violence (Dania & Singhaputargun, 2020; Gellner, 2017) and can even cause more fatalities and miseries than direct violence (Galtung, 1985; Rylko-Bauer & Farmer, 2016). It is "structured by historically given (and often economically driven) processes" (Farmer, 2004, p. 40) "with their deep histories, become embodied and experienced as violence" (Saussy, 2010, p. 293). In general, structural violence impairs people's ability to meet basic human requirements such as food, shelter, health, education, and security.

Cultural violence is a form of violence tolerated by a society's value system. Besides, it enables structural and direct violence to be acceptable and functional, at least in part, by blocking people from recognizing violent acts or realities and making them consider the violence normal behavior (Galtung, 1969, 1990, 2018).

According to Galtung (1990), the opposite of structural and cultural peace, or positive peace, is structural and cultural violence, which is addressed through structural change, such as eliminating historically entrenched injustice. In this study, therefore, the course of industrial development and peace is seen in the face of structural and cultural violence, being placed in a structural context where the industrialization process is compromising the rights and securities of smallholder farmers.

5.0 Methods of the Study

Data for this article was collected during fieldwork held in 2022 and 2023. The study was conducted in Lume District (see Figure 1), one of the ten districts of the East Shawa Zone, Oromia National Regional State, Ethiopia. Lume District is found 70 kilometers to the southeast of Finfinnee—Addis Ababa— (Bayecha, 2013; Wondu, 2021). Its proximity to the capital city of Addis Ababa on the road to Djibouti, as well as its water and land resources, attracted various industries such as (a) tannery, (b) horticulture, (c) mineral extraction, (d) cement factories, (e) butchery, (f) transport, and (g) floriculture industries. Lume District has 384 investment projects spread over an area of 556 hectares, of which 55.7% of total investments are in industry, accounting for 80% of hectares of land (Lumee District Investment and Industry Office, 2023; Mojo City Administration Investment and Industry Office, 2023). The district is characterized by small-scale farming (Bayecha, 2013), with an average of 3–5 hectares of farmland owned by each farmer. The study focused on six of the 41 rural sub-districts in Lume District, namely (a) Kurma Fatole, (b) Tafi Abo, (c) Shara Dibandiba, (d) Ejersa Joro, (e) Koka Nagawo, and (f) Dungugi Bakale, which were chosen purposefully based on the physical, economic, environmental, and socio-political connection of the sub-districts to the industries. Moreover, social, economic, cultural, health, and environmental complications on the farming community due to industries in these areas were reported by the Oromia Broadcasting Network (2017, 2019, 2022) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2019), making these subdistricts viable for this study. Out of 13 privately owned tanneries and nine privately owned floriculture industries in the district, four tanneries and three floriculture industries were randomly selected and used as a source of data.

In this study, a case study design, a qualitative approach, and primary data were used. Because a case study design entails a thorough and contextualized scientific investigation into a real-world phenomenon (Ridder, 2017) and allows an in-depth understanding of relevant situations (Gerring, 2016), this design was preferred to be used to investigate the impact of the course of industries on farmers' peace.

Twelve members of the farming community took part in in-depth interviews (IIs), of which four were women. Four focus group discussions (FGDs), three consisting of men and one consisting of 6 women, were conducted with 25 members of the farming community. A total of 12 officials and experts from federal and regional offices, as well as experts and management from the industries, took part in key informant (KI) interviews. The selection of in-depth interviewees and FGDs was purposefully done based on their attachment to the industries, and key informants were also purposefully chosen based on their knowledge of the impact of industries on rural agricultural communities. The saturation principle was used to fix the number of participants in in-depth interviews. The number of participants for the key informant interviews was fixed beforehand based on the demand of the study and the manageability of the data. The number of FGDs was set to four to consider various parts of the farming community.

Based on the qualitative approach used, in-depth interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and desk reviews were used to gather data. The data collected using audio recording and note-taking were then analyzed and interpreted using thematic analysis adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006).

The researchers began data collection after obtaining a permission letter from the Haramaya University Postgraduate Directorate. During data collection, full information was given to the research participants about the aim of the study, and

their consent was obtained. They were also informed they had the full right to resign at any point during collection. Moreover, the anonymity of the participants was ensured by using codes instead of the actual names of the participants during the presentation of the data and discussion of the results (Creswell, 2009).

Socio-political, linguistic, and cultural affiliation of the researchers with the study area and frequent and extended contact of the researchers with the research participants helped them to obtain data on the interaction between the course of industrialization and peace, which is a sensitive and complex issue. In the meantime, knowing the consequence of their affiliation with the research participants on the finding of the study, they worked to minimize their etic dominance by relying on bracketing—approaching the topic under research with an open mind, free of predefined hypotheses—to better demonstrate the participants' emic experiences (Dörfler & Stierand, 2021). Moreover, the researchers suppressed their subjective judgment involved due to their attachment to the issue and the whole context by going back and forth between the data and the analysis. In due course, the researchers acknowledge and take account of the subjectivity emerging in the process, as it is difficult to completely escape it.

Figure 1. Map of the study area.



Source: Belda et al. (2024).

6.0 Results and Discussion

This section presents the results and discussion of the data.

6.1 Viewing Industrial Development as a Must

Industrialization has been regarded as an essential priority in Ethiopia due to the belief held by global nationalists that industries are more important to economic development than agriculture. Hence, many of the problems that arise in relation to industries have to do with the cultural violence of owning industry at any sacrifice to the people and the ecology.

The idea that industry is more essential to economic development than agriculture has led to the establishment of tannery industries that do not meet the required standards and do not effectively utilize technologies at hand. Out of 21 tannery industries, including the 13 tannery industries in the study area, all possessed primary treatment plants, of which 71.42% were effectively used; 16 of them owned secondary treatment plants, of which 56.25% were effectively used; and none had tertiary treatment plants. They all had a part in harming the environment and public health (Environmental Protection Authority, 2022). Establishing industries without meeting fundamental requirements, which is part of the project, and being unable to fulfill them when their consequences deteriorate the environment and the livelihood of the farming community shows how the issue is embedded in the political culture of development.

Passing through an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and having treatment plants are not a guarantee to keep the environment and people safe. What matters most is whether they are used properly and effectively, which is overlooked in the study area. EIAs are conducted for face value, either to satisfy criteria at the time of the inception or to eventually obtain political, financial, and technical assistance. According to the sources, during their establishment, the industries did agree to treat, reuse, and recycle waste materials, including water and chemicals. Once they pass the EIA criteria on paper, they do not consider it in practice (personal communication, KI1, February 8, 2023; KI4, February 2, 2023; KI7, February 6, 2023; KI8, February 6, 2023).

It was not impractical to develop treatment plants and put them into operation to safeguard the environment, plants, animals, and safety of the people. Because having industries without treatment plants was impossible and inconceivable from the start. However, protection of industries was meticulously established to have industries at whatever cost to gain from them, and this became part of the culture of development operating as cultural violence. As a result, violent development practices become embedded in the development of political culture, shielding the structural violence—the suffering of the farming community in the study area from human insecurities such as environmental, food, health, and economic insecurities—when industry owners, the state, and state agents are benefiting from it.

According to a key informant, the ineffective use of the existing treatment plants to the expected standard is not to spend money (personal communication, KI11, March 31, 2022). Not doing what they should do to protect both the citizens and the environment to unnecessarily save money shows how greedy development is and how neglectful the system is. This shows the fact that the smallholders hosting the industries have been suffering from problems that could have been avoided had the development policies and practices been given due care. On this point, Galtung

(1969), Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2016) stated that structural violence is avoidable harm, that is, harm that happens despite the potential to prevent it, according to Farmer (2004), for undue economic gain.

On the negative impact of the violent culture of industrial development on environmental conservation and social protection, a key informant said, "As the issue becomes acculturated, the concerned bodies, including the government [the system], do not see it as a problem that deserves attention." As the informant further argued, the likelihood of getting this problem solved is rare due to its long foundation in the political culture of the state (personal communication, KI9, April 6, 2022). Overlooking structural violence as normal behavior is possible when the powerful calculate their advantages at the expense of the powerless. As Ho (2007) and Rylko-Bauer and Farmer (2016) pinpointed, the powerful galvanize and naturalize structural violence to maintain its historically inherent advantage. In this case, the system, giving due attention to economic gain, ignores both the direct and indirect effects of industries on smallholder farmers.

6.2 Violent Development Discourse

The culturally and structurally violent investment attraction discourse and labor proclamation have played significant roles in the farmers marginalization and economic insecurity. The ill-considered discourse, a cultural violence, that the workforce is cheap in Ethiopia made the investors expose the underprivileged to structural violence. According to key informants, foreign investors were told that they would have a cheap workforce and invest at minimum cost (personal communication, KI7, February 6, 2023; KI9, April 6, 2022; KI11, March 31, 2022). According to Gebeyehu (2022) and Hardy and Hauge (2019), a cultural violence—that is cheap labor—has been used to attract investment in Ethiopia, which has been known to generate tremendous social, cultural, and economic violence against the relegated people. Cheap labor is an extension of a colonial capitalist mode of exploitation designed to extract labor at low cost in the less developed world (Ghosh, 2019; Rodney, 1973) against humanity and basic human rights.

Similarly, the cultural violence embedded in the country's labor proclamation developed at various times has caused economic harm to workers in industrial development. According to KI, in Labor Proclamation 377/2003, the government left the minimum wage open to be decided by the employers (personal communication, KI3, April 1, 2022). The proclamation stated nothing about the minimum salary and salary improvements as well (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004). This provided limitless power and fertile ground for the investors to set the salary scale on their own (personal communication, KI3, April 1, 2022), exploiting the citizens, particularly the farmers who provided land, their means of livelihood, and promised better salary and life, exposing them to structural violence.

Different from Labor Proclamation No. 377/2003, Labor Proclamation No. 1156/2019 says that the council of ministers, together with other stakeholders, will revise and decide the minimum wage based on the country's economic development, labor market, and other considerations (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019). According to KI, however, this has not been put into practice (personal communication, KI3, April 1, 2022). Three years after this proclamation, the mayor of Mojo Town, in his interview with Oromia Broadcasting Network, depicted that though the municipal office knew the

problem in relation to the salary, it did not intervene as the minimum labor wage had not been determined (Oromia Broadcasting Network, 2022). The above evidence suggests that the state is consciously silent and has a stake in the cultural and structural marginalization of citizens.

Due to these facts, investors adopted a culture of investment that exploits the people and the environment, accruing capital at their expense. The culturally violent—cheap labor discriminatory rhetoric—and the gap in labor proclamation, which was an extension of the colonial mode of production, provided firm power to investors (capitalists) to set minimum wages, exposing the laborers from the agricultural communities to economic insecurity.

Consequently, the culturally violent discourse, that is, cheap labor, exposed farmers to extractivism and commodification of their being in the form of labor for trivial return and commodification of their basic needs, such as food, shelter, clothing, education, and healthcare, for no return. Commodification of labor is a politically motivated consequence on people that results from unequal access to resources, eventually risking peace (Prudham, 2015). Extractivism is the capitalist mode of capital accumulation by which massive quantities of raw natural resources, such as minerals or oil, are extracted and exported. Extractivism is also present in farming, forestry, and even fishing (Acosta, 2013). In this study, the concept of extractivism is used to explain how industries extract labor resources, labeling it 'cheap labor' (Kothari & Harcourt, 2022)—a capitalist mode of exploitation rooted in a colonial dependency system (Ghosh, 2019)—and make them commoditize themselves for an incomparable market.

A promised job opportunity and a good wage that could improve farming communities' livelihoods were the techniques the industry used to approach farmers to get land (personal communication, FGD1, April 7, 2021; FGD2, April 8, 2022; FGD3, April 9, 2022; II3, April 9, 2022; II4, April 9, 2022). Although farming communities did not get job opportunities as per the promises and the expectations, those who have had the opportunity to be employed pointed out that the salary they received instead of changing put them in a miserable life. On this point, an in-depth interviewee participant said, "working in the industry makes us neither die nor live." (personal communication, II6, April 14, 2022). Workers get a salary far less than what they earn from working in agriculture or informal daily labor (personal communication, II2, April 9, 2022; II6, April 14, 2022; KI9, April 6, 2022). The statements imply that working in the industry makes them live a miserable life.

In-depth interviewees, in depicting the insignificance of the salary being paid by the industries compared with the salary of the day laborers on farmland, disclosed that instead of working in an industry that pays 40–100 ETB per day, working on daily labor work for 200–300 ETB per day is by far better (personal communication, II6, April 14, 2022; II2, April 9, 2022). "For this reason, I sought daily labor work instead of joining the tannery industry in our area." (personal communication, II6, April 14, 2022).

In the study area, smallholders are not only commoditizing their labor but also are spending what they own and their livelihood on industries. In mentioning how industries extracted smallholder farmers, a farmer who was an in-depth interviewee mentioned that while he needed support on the farm, his son was hired in the tannery industry. The interviewed father paid 1,600 birr a month for the one who supported him on the farm, while his son living with him was paid 1,500 ETB

a month (50 ETB per day; personal communication, II9, April 8, 2022). If his son eats a 50-birr meal three times, the family spends 100 birr per day for his food in addition to covering housing, clothing, hygiene, and health costs for their son to let him work in the industry (personal communication, II9, April 8, 2022; FGD2, April 8, 2022). The words of an FGD participant, "Industries do not benefit us; rather, they become a burden to us," are an important expression that recaps the exploitation industries posed on the farming community (personal communication, FGD2, April 8, 2022). Based on these facts, the farmers raised a question of whether the industries are creating job opportunities for them or if they are costing their being and livelihood for the industries personal communication, (personal communication, II9, April 8, 2022).

Going beyond labor extraction and commodification, industries grab farmers livelihoods. Although the self-sufficient farmer portrayed the economic challenges brought by the industries in this manner, it is clear how farmers whose land has been taken for the development of the industry have been suffering. This shows the selfishness of the industries to accumulate capital at the expense of the people and how the citizens were culturally and structurally marginalized in the development program. Literature also stated that deprivation from food and basic needs always encourages the poor to commodify their labor for insignificant wages, only for the sake of survival (Prudham, 2015). After losing their means of lasting survival, farmers surrendered to commoditizing their labor again for unbalanced exchange, leading to the decay of peace.

Industries are places where desperate people stay to spend time. In accentuating the irrelevance of the salary, an in-depth interviewee said that food is cheap in some and free in other industries. That is why individuals are hired there. However, the interviewee asked what 1,100 ETB a month means for a family consisting of at least a husband, wife, and child right now. Many workers get paid the same. This salary is for a person, especially someone who is hopeless and wishes to spend time there rather than live on it (personal communication, II10, April 14, 2022). This shows the incompatibility between the purpose of industry as a development process—improving the quality of the life of the people—and the practice in the study area and how the industries are extracting the farming community and other citizens in general.

Culturally violent, exclusionary, and exploitative development discourse and practice did not only structurally marginalize farmers in comparison to industry owners but also women based on the division of labor. A woman who was an in-depth interviewee participant added that she has been employed for six years, and she earns a salary of 45 ETB per day (personal communication, II11, April 7, 2022). Women interviewees and FGD participants also depicted that women are exhausted and dying in there without any change in their lives. No one sees their troubles. Particularly women are being paid far less than the amount men are being paid. Covertly there are works meant for men and women, and payments are made in that regard (personal communication, II11, April 7, 2022; II12, April 7, 2022; FGD4, April 14, 2022). Globally, works were feminized, labeled as insignificant, and regarded as less costly without their gravity for being solely dominated by women. Moreover, training, technologies, and finance were geared to men to exclude women from the range of development works (Aguinaga et al., 2013). Structural inequalities embedded in the development system marginalized women and exposed them to fatal economic insecurity compared to men.

Serious salary-based disputes between the industries and employees have erupted repeatedly over a period, similar to wage earners in the colonial period. Many incidents that result in casualties have been happening now and then and here and there, affecting farming communities' peace (personal communication, KI3, April 1, 2022; KI12, April 15, 2022). Literature also revealed that development programs in Ethiopia have deepened inequality, restricted access to vital resources, and increased tensions between competing agricultural communities and between agricultural communities and the state (Wayessa, 2020). The extraction of labor, which in many cases perpetuates the colonial system (Ghosh, 2019; Kothari & Harcourt, 2022), being a feature of state development culture, reinforces economic inequalities between farmers and industry owners, farmers who gave land for development and those who did not, and men and women, intensifying structural violence and insecurities in the study area.

6.3 Securitization of Development

In the study area, securitization of development being an aspect of cultural violence has been known to be used as a cover for any harm to the farmer. In this regard, in-depth and key informant interviewees stated that development is used as a justification for land grabbing (personal communication, II1, April 7, 2022; II5, April 13, 2022; II7, April 16, 2022) and tolerating any harm to people and the environment (personal communication, KI1, February 8, 2023; KI5, April 5, 2023; KI6, April 6, 2022). Anyone who opts against land grabbing, environmental degradation, and harm to the populace has been viewed as anti-development and peace and then subjected to imprisonment and torture (personal communication, II7, April 16, 2022). According to Gebresenbet (2014), the Ethiopian government securitizes development to counter any attempt to undermine it. This gives state officials working as brokers the authority to abuse resources and humanity.

According to an in-depth interviewee, "while those in the administrative structure facilitate conditions, those who come in the name of investment sell the land they take and share the profits" (personal communication, II5, April 13, 2022). The data suggests that land is seized from farmers for development purposes, but it has been turned into a marketable commodity by investors in partnership with government officials acting as brokers. It has been depicted in the literature that smallholders are being exploited by powerful local and/or foreign investors, often in coordination with corrupt state authorities (Jayne et al., 2022). Land, therefore, plays the role of a commodity, where the powerful confiscate it for a small amount from landholders and use it as a source of cash in the study area.

When farmers asserted their rights over industrial development-induced land grabbing and pollution, corrupt authorities used the power that came with securitizing development to attack and imprison them, resulting in their death, disappearance, and lasting physical impairment (personal communication, II1, April 7, 2022; II3, April 9, 2022; KI3, April 1, 2022; KI10, March 31, 2022). As a result, land grabbing and commercialization during industrial expansion prohibited future generations from obtaining land or other necessities of existence (Jayne et al., 2021), leading to widespread social conflict and worsened social disparity, which gradually erodes communities' well-being and social capital (Hall & Kepe, 2017).

In supporting the use of development and its securitization as a pretext to plunder smallholders, literature revealed that political elites use development as a cover to

quell farmers (Belda et al., 2024) through politicizing and securitizing development (Gebresenbet, 2014), which Martinez-Alier (2009) termed the politicization of the environment for the benefit of a few political entrepreneurs at the expense of the mass.

6.4 Frontier Development

Frontier development—the process of creating underutilized, underdeveloped, and uncivilized space that requires government intervention for proper utilization, civilization, and development—is a culturally violent development practice that has long been used in Oromia over Oromo farmers (Hindeya, 2018; Markakis, 2011). This is much like Western maldevelopment practices in the less developed world (Ghosh, 2019). The cultural violence—frontier development—has been carried out as if the local farming community does not rely on those resources for their livelihood, (Abate, 2019), giving room for the maneuver of structural violence in the area considered frontier.

Participants in the FGD alluded to the present situation of land grabs among smallholders, citing a historical song illustrating the marginalization and oppression that forced their ancestors to leave their homes to settle on new land under the guise of frontier development. The song is indicated in Table 1 as follows.

Table 1. *Historical Song Illustrating Farmers' Marginalization*

Afaan Oromoo	**English Translation**
Sii baye biyyaa; sii bayee.	I left the village for you; I left it for you.
Yaa abbaa lafaa, sii bayee.	You landlord, I left for you.
Sii baye biyyaa; sii bayee.	I left the village for you; I left it for you.
Yoo Hadaan ollaa sii ta'ee,	If Bidens macroptera becomes your neighbor,
Yoo Muujjaan jigii sii bahee.	If Snowdina polystarchia reaches out for help in times of your need.

Note: Personal communication, FGDs2, April 8, 2022.

According to the FGD participants in Table 1, similar frontier development-induced systematic land grabbing and displacement of the farmers' ancestors in the feudal era has been happening to the farmers in the study area with different intentions and magnitudes. This suggests that frontier development-induced land grabbing is both historical and contemporary, the former with the culturally violent discourse of civilizing the uncivilized (Markakis, 2011) and the latter with the culturally violent discourse of bringing economic development to the frontier (Hindeya, 2018), where the goal in both times was illegal access to land resource.

To illustrate the betrayal that happened to farmers in the course of industrial development through frontier development, an in-depth interviewee analogously narrated the story of a *Garbii (*Acacia albida) tree grown on an *Odaa* (Sycamore) tree that the researchers and the interviewee unexpectedly came across during the fieldwork. The story symbolizes development work betrayal against smallholder farmers. The in-depth interviewee stated,

> The *Garbii* tree politely asked the *Odaa* to give it a place to stay for a night, and the *Odaa* tree allowed it. After finding a place to stay the night, the *Garbii* tree refused to leave and started to push the trunk of the *Odaa* apart and knock it down. It pushed the *Odaa* tree aside, went up, and looked down at *Odaa*. It happened so. This is what happened to us [farmers] (II9, April 8, 2022).

The in-depth interviewee raised this idea to show how the farmers have lost the resources they owned for generations through the act of frontier development. The *Garbii* tree, instead of thankfully leaving the *Odaa* tree as per their agreement after getting accommodation, became the parasite and demolished it. The same has been said to have happened to the smallholders in the study area. The people gave land to industry and accommodated it. But industry development, instead of benefiting the community through employment, sharing from development output, and doing what they promised at the beginning, has engaged in hurting them (personal communication, FGDs2, April 8, 2022; KI2, April 15, 2022; II3, April 9, 2022), just like *Garbii* did to the *Odaa* tree.

Hence, the process of frontier development in the study area exposed farmers to fatal structural violence such as displacement from their village (personal communication, FGDs2, April 8, 2022), economic insecurity through decline in crop production and number of cattle, and health insecurity. Due to economic insecurity, some farmers become guards for a trivial amount of salary (personal communication, II2, April 9, 2022); some were unable to survive and send their children to school (personal communication, II4, April 9, 2022); and some have disappeared (personal communication, II8, April 16, 2022). Moreover, the structural marginalization of the farming community through a cultural violence frontier development exposed the farming community to personal insecurity issues such as assault, irreversible damage, disappearance, death, and imprisonment in response to their quest for their rights impairment (personal communication, II1, April 7, 2022; II3, April 9, 2022; KI3, April 1, 2022; KI10, March 31, 2022).

Regarding the marginalization of citizens in the name of frontier development, Kothari and Harcourt (2022) claim that people who have political and economic dominance through democratic processes and in the name of frontier development continue to defend violent structures and systems that benefit them at the expense of diversity, ecologies, and cultural pluralities. This shows the priority for economic benefits over people's survival, which aligns with the argument that structural violence is predominantly driven by the economy (Farmer, 2004).

7.0 Conclusion

To achieve development goals and benefit the country and community, development trajectories should adhere to development requirements. However, the route of industrial development in Ethiopia in general and in the study area in particular is replete with plots, devious, irrational, and miserable practices that result in cultural and structural violence. Both violences have historically been rooted in and are deeply embedded in the political and administrative norms of state industrial development. The main driver of cultural and structural violence in the study area is the economic issue, which illegally goes to the state or state agents, inflicting harm on citizens in general and smallholder farmers in particular.

The course of industrial development in the study area is characterized by viewing industrial development as a must, violent development discourse, securitization of development, and frontier development. All these have resulted in the use of incompatible and outdated technologies, incomplete plants, a disorganized waste management system, and improper use of technologies. These factors have had a significant impact on smallholder farmers' peace, who have been exposed to all other threats related to pollution and violent conflict besides losing their land to industries and becoming economically insecure. In their approaches to industrial expansion, the state and its agents have been operating against the fundamental values of social protection, environmental conservation, and human and economic rights. This has happened due to the inherent cultural and structural violence built on undue economic interest.

8.0 Recommendation

Since development is improving people's livelihoods, every effort must be made to mitigate industry-development-associated structural and cultural violence endangering the rural agricultural community. Averting structural and cultural violence in relation to industrialization requires restructuring the development-farmer relationship. To address structural and cultural issues arising from the course of industrial development, it is necessary to address the historical, political, cultural, and economic injustices ingrained in the state-smallholder farmer structural relationship and exploitative capitalist mode of industrialization. Thus, challenging and changing the established violent political-economic-administrative norm of industrial development built into history and acculturated into the development structure of the state is crucial. The shift in the structure, specifically, should accommodate introducing just and fair land use and practice policies, introducing environmentally friendly industries, and improving the standard of the existing industries and their waste management systems. True peace requires transforming development-induced structural and cultural violence into development-induced structural and cultural peace, which is the backbone of achieving inorganic—negative—peace as well. Sustainable development requires sustainable peace, which in turn requires the absence of structural and cultural violence.

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