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Struggling with New Regionalism: Government Trumps Governance in Northern British Columbia, Canada

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of a (new) regionalist development process that sought to enable communities, within a rural region of British Columbia, Canada, to chart a new strategic direction for their future development. We highlight the case of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition (C-CBAC), which formed in response to the mountain pine beetle infestation that has destroyed much of the province’s pine forests. Spurred by this crisis, the C-CBAC formed to create community and economic transition strategies to cope with long-term economic restructuring and environmental change. While the coalition has achieved many admirable successes, internal governance struggles and the reliance of senior governments on traditional vehicles to distribute supports have severely hindered any regionalist potential for implementation. Ultimately, government trumped governance in this attempt to construct a new regional ideal. The paper highlights the need for ‘co-constructing’ new regional governance, which entails both bottom-up and top-down responsibility and coordination in the implementation of new regional development processes.

Keywords: regional governance; rural; new regionalism; British Columbia
1.0 Introduction

Rural and small town communities in Canada, and in other industrialized countries, have been struggling with significant forces of restructuring over the past thirty years. In Canada, the recession of the early 1980s marked a sea change as the combined forces of industrial flexibility and the roll-out of neoliberal ideologies dramatically altered the economic contributions and stewardship roles large industries and senior governments had traditionally played in rural resource regions.

In British Columbia (BC), Canada, these changes have been particularly impactful, as owing to a history of ‘instant town’ development in the post-war period, many rural resource towns were created to serve single industries or industrial processes (Gill, 2002; Porteous, 1987). In the absence of significant preparation or a history of efforts to diversify local economies, rural communities in BC were, and many remain, in precarious conditions. Even those communities in regions experiencing recent resource booms (for example in the oil and gas rich areas of the northeast), community capacity and diversification remain limited.

Researchers and practitioners have sought to understand and construct appropriate development and policy responses to the new economic and government realities facing rural regions. Using a simple framework of top-down and bottom-up to identify the directionality of these responses (and to reflect the new shared responsibility for development associated with or motivated by restructuring), there is a rich range of literatures interested in the processes and prospects associated with more fluid and multi-dimensional patterns of rural development. For example, from community economic development (CED) to new regionalism, a range of literatures speak to the need for rural and small town places to ‘scale-up’ by working in partnership and across regions (Amin, 2004; Terluin, 2003; Vodden, 2010).

The central idea inherent in these approaches is that individual communities lack the capacity necessary to manage complex development infrastructure and processes that used to be the responsibility of senior governments, and must seek to combine resources. “Capacity” includes the breadth of human, social, cultural, and institutional infrastructure of a community. More than the sum of individual skills, knowledge, and abilities, it refers to a collective ability to identify, organize, and mobilize information and resources to create and support the strategies and partnerships which can take advantage of changing circumstances. Embedded in the term are notions of social capital and social cohesions, as well as institutional memory and technical, fiscal, and receptor capacity (Markey, Halseth, & Manson, 2012). Individual communities themselves may have plans and take-on different development projects, but in order to have a more significant presence within a dynamic top-down, bottom-up world (i.e., have the capacity to send pressure and feedback up the system and not simply be the powerless recipients of decisions from above or from distance places), regional cooperation is a necessity. These pressures are responsible, in part, for a resurgence of interest in regional development.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of a (new) regionalist development process that sought to enable communities, within a rural region of BC, the Cariboo-Chilcotin, to chart a new strategic direction for their future development. The Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition (C-CBAC) was formed to create community and regional economic transition strategies to cope with impacts of long-term economic restructuring, primarily in the forest sector, and the related impacts of the mountain pine beetle, that has devastated the interior
forestlands of BC. Our study illustrates that the coalition was successful in forging a working relationship and a series of strategic plans. When it came time for implementation, however, traditional government mechanisms splintered the collaborative spirit and structure of the coalition, as local mayors vied for funding, prestige, and re-election. Senior governments tried to enact supportive policy and programming, but the structure supporting the regionalist cooperation was embedded in older notions of ‘government’ and exacerbated the collapse of regional governance in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. As such, this paper reflects upon the value of ‘co-constructing’ new regional governance mechanisms and the challenges that these new ways face from a host of entrenched mechanisms and interests.

In the following sections we present more information on the case context and our methods. This is followed by our literature review, focusing on new regionalism. We then present our case study of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition, which is followed by our findings and conclusions. Our intention is to provide an embedded, explanatory case study research that will help to address calls for theoretically informed studies on new regionalism (Barnes, Britton, Coffey, Edgington, Gertler, & Norcliffe, 2000; Beer, Clower, Haughtow & Maude, 2005; Gertler, 2010; Harrison, 2013; Lovering, 1999; Yin, 2013). We also hope that, while this case study is embedded within the particularities of northern BC, the findings and lessons concerning regional governance will resonate with other rural resource regions internationally.

2.0 Context and Methods: Approaching the Cariboo-Chilcotin Region

The Cariboo-Chilcotin region is located in south-central BC. Covering approximately one-tenth of the province’s land area (see Figure 1), the 2011 population of the region was 65,847. As in many rural resource regions, the Cariboo-Chilcotin experienced steady population growth from the end of the Second World War until the mid- to late 1980s. Since that time, restructuring in the forest sector, and commensurate reductions in public service expenditures, have resulted in population decline over the past two decades. Most recently, population data show no appreciable change (British Columbia Statistics, 2011).

In terms of government, the Cariboo-Chilcotin region falls within a single ‘regional district’. The Cariboo Regional District (CRD) was created in the late 1960s as part of an initiative by the provincial government to coordinate services between local governments and to provide a local government mechanism for unincorporated rural areas that lay outside of municipal boundaries (Bish & Clemens, 2008). Within the CRD, there are four local government jurisdictions: Williams Lake, Quesnel, Wells, and 100 Mile House. In addition to these local government organizations, there are three First Nation Tribal Councils whose traditional territories cover portions of the region: Carrier-Chilcotin Tribal Council, Northern Shuswap Tribal Council, and the Tsilhqot’in National Government. In addition to the tribal councils, there are more than fifteen individual bands comprising the on-reserve Aboriginal population. The region is, in other words, a complex and culturally diverse local government landscape.

The region is characterized by many small and low order settlements. These are dispersed across the region, with some clustering along the north-south transportation corridor of Highway 97. The mountainous terrain on the eastern and
western borders of the CRD, as well as the plateau landscape deeply bisected by river valleys, makes transportation and communication both difficult and expensive.

Figure 1: The Cariboo-Chilcotin region within British Columbia.

For more than two centuries, the economic foundation of the Cariboo-Chilcotin has been based on natural resource extraction, including fur, gold, agricultural products, and forest products (Little, 1996; McGillivray, 2011; Williston & Keller, 1997). Currently, the forest industry employs approximately one in five people in the region (see Table 1); residents of the CRD are more likely to be employed in forestry than residents in the rest of the province (Horne, 2009a, 2009b). By the same measures, 3% of the provincial population is directly employed in the forest industry. Other industries in the region include agriculture (primarily ranching), mining, and tourism.

This paper is drawn from a two-year qualitative study in the region. Our research was driven by two objectives: first, to understand the devolution of rural regional development governance in broad terms, comparing our study region to trends in international rural regional development; and second, against the background of a history of regional activity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, to understand what factors assisted or impeded the specific formation of the C-CBAC? The two key concepts here are devolution and governance. We understand “devolution” as the granting of assignment of authority or powers from a senior body to a junior body. The key questions centre upon the type of authority or powers granted (i.e., advising, planning, decision making) and the level of accompanying statutory/legislative or
budgetary support also transferred (Jessop 2001; Wilson 2004). In turn, the concept of “governance” generally refers to the process of managing participation and involvement towards decision making (Bryant, 2011; Douglas, 2005; Marsden & Murdoch, 1998; O’Toole & Burdess, 2004). This is increasingly important in regional development as a wider range of groups and interests now wish to participate in debates, dialogues, and the other related processes around economic and community development. The inclusion of these new voices is part of a longer term shift in policy and public expectations which now means that our previous focus on singular government actors must give way to broader processes and participants. The formation of CCBAC follows from these definitions in that a wider range of local and regional voices were now brought to the table to debate and plan the collective response to a significant economic and environmental challenge.

Table 1. Employment Sector Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>CRD</th>
<th>BC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Force – all industries</td>
<td>32,775</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation and Food Services</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>6,995</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry &amp; Logging</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Activities for Forestry</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Product Manufacturing</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Manufacturing</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Mineral Products</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Most current information as of November 2014.

We employed three methods in the study. Over 29 days in May-June 2008, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 47 regional actors. Purposive non-stratified sampling informed the selection of a subset of decision-makers in the region who could provide information-rich cases (Patton, 1990); interviewees were selected from a sampling framework that considered regional location, rural/urban proximity, sector representation, and if they were involved or not involved in C-CCBAC or other previous regional planning process. Second, we were granted observation status to attend six local meetings and gatherings, including a local government Council meeting, three civic events, a local government election meeting, and an invitation-only community social development meeting. Some of these gatherings were more relevant to the research objectives than others, but being present provided situational context to support the analysis through empirical observations and perceptions. Observation complements the case-study approach, as it provides opportunity to gain descriptive information (Kearns, 2005). Finally, we conducted manifest and latent content analysis of secondary data, drawing upon policy reports, community and regional development reports, and documents
specific to the operations and planning of the C-CBAC (Babbie, 2004; Krippendorff & Bock, 2009).

3.0 Rural Restructuring and the Rise of New Regionalism

Change in the rural Canadian landscape is not a new phenomenon; however, it is occurring at an increasing pace (Hayter, 2000; Reimer, 2002). Since the 1980s, international research suggests that rural places have faced significant challenges in the face of global change (Argent, Walmsley, & Sorensen, 2010; Bradbury & St-Martin, 1983; Herbert-Cheshire, 2000; Neil, Tykkäinen, & Bradbury, 1992; O’Toole & Burdess, 2004; Storey, 2001). As mentioned above, in BC, large-scale forest industry firms began to restructure production regimes to respond to market volatility and competitiveness. This was achieved through increased use of technology and a subsequent concentration of many smaller firms into fewer and larger companies. This was part of the transition from a ‘Fordist’ to a ‘flexible’ production regime (Hayter, 2000; Hayter & Barnes, 1997). The replacement of labour by technology led to significant job losses throughout the province, increasing the number of part-time or ‘flexible’ workers, and severely undermined traditional patterns of job stability (Barnes & Hayter, 1994).

Economic restructuring ultimately translates into a restructuring of social life, as social change in rural and small town places is closely linked to economic development (Markey et al., 2012; Reed & Gill, 1997). For example, job loss, population loss, and accordant service losses are all attributed to industrial restructuring in a changing economy (Furuseth, 1998; Halseth, Markey, & Bruce, 2010; Reed, 2003). Specifically given resource employment migration patterns, local populations in resource-dependent places fluctuate with local economic prosperity (Halseth, 1999; Hayter, 1979). At the same time, there can be an increased demand for community services in places that are experiencing economic restructuring (Halseth & Ryser, 2006). The cumulative impact of all of these changes is a much more precarious environment within which rural and small town places have to plan for their futures—in a context of less senior government and industry intervention assistance.

With increasing global economic interconnectedness, some governments have reformed their political strategies to be more internationally competitive (Amin, 1999; Keating, 2003). This neoliberal reform is a “political strategy based on deregulation of the economy, privatization, a reduced commitment to social welfare, and a focus on international competitiveness” (Tonts & Haslam-McKenzie, 2005, p. 183). Neoliberalism is defined by state downsizing and placing greater emphasis on the adoption of these roles by individuals, the non-profit sector, and the private sector (Tonts, 1999). As Klein, Fontan and Tremblay (2009) note, “state intervention did not disappear entirely, but the state began assuming more the role of facilitator, or guide than that of initiator” (p. 29).

Following international trends, the Canadian and BC governments have reformed their political strategies to increase international economic competitiveness (Keating, 2003; Markey, Halseth, & Manson, 2008a; Turok, 2004). Prior to the 1980s, Canada’s regional development was defined by a Keynesian approach to the planning of public services, with “public planners creating conditions to make private-sector growth more efficient” (Fairbairn, 1998, p. 13). However, with the transition towards neoliberalism, centrally coordinated responses to regional
economic disparities at the federal and provincial levels began to be phased out (Markey et al., 2008a).

The literature presents two arguments for why senior governments have changed their role with regard to rural regional development planning. First, there have been greater calls for ‘bottom-up’ local representation and control over future development trajectories (MacKinnon, 2002; Markey, Pierce, Vodden, & Roseland, 2005). Communities and regions have, over the years, become frustrated with the government provision of programs and services, and have sought to mobilize local capacity to take control of their own future development (Bruce, 1997; Kretzmann & McKnight, 1993). This response is an anticipated or desired outcome of the neoliberal strategy. In this, communities and regions may feel that they are better positioned to make development decisions given their level of local knowledge, an outcome supported by the principles of subsidiarity. Proponents of this approach argue that the local level should be empowered and supported to development and augment local capacity. Here, a ‘bottom-up’ approach works to address limitations of previous ‘top-down’ regimes (Herbert-Cheshire, 2000; MacKinnon, 2002).

Others argue that the central state is simply vacating its ‘top-down’ role as an organizer of rural regional development (Young & Matthews, 2007). As Polèse (1999, p. 309) notes:

The author cannot help but feel that ‘local development’, as a policy ideal, is in the end closer to a silent surrender, an implicit admission that the central state really cannot do much about unequal development and regional disparities.

Various researchers contend that previous Canadian federal policy interventions had not produced satisfactory results for endogenous growth (Fairbairn, 1998; Savoie, 1992). At times, they have achieved the opposite. If the central state abandons its involvement with regional development, then the benefits associated with centralized programs, such as large budgets and having access to the crucial policy levers that can affect change, are removed. As a result, there is the potential for a widening gap or growing disconnect between what might be needed to support rural regional development on the ground and the crucial public policy supports that will be needed to realize successful implementation of initiatives and visions.

As the central state plays less of a direct role in regional development, and less policy or practical support is available from ‘above’, places are left with little choice but to leverage local capacity and seek to adopt new roles (Alpert, Gainsborough, & Wallis, 2006; Jones, Paasi, & Sciences, 2013; Markey, Halseth, & Manson, 2007; Morrison, Wilson, & Bell, 2012). In such a changing world, innovation is key and “new ways of organizing are required to mobilize human, financial, and other resources necessary for facilitating actions across sectors (public, private, non-profit) and communities that share common problems” (Cigler, 1999, p. 87). Past regional approaches were directed by a narrow economic imperative through, for example, the use of growth pole theory to anchor economic regions. More recently, regions are being promoted as increasingly innovative political, economic, cultural, and social spaces (Scott, 2004; Storper, 1995).

These shifts in the mandate of government and tensions between enabling or abandoning roles for senior government, help to frame and inform the literature on new regionalism. New regionalism has emerged as a robust, diverse, and contested
theory. The origins of new regionalism are broadly linked with the transformation to post-Fordism and the subsequent revealing of regional disparities that were, to some degree, hidden by a combination of the Fordist industrial structure and government support (Markey, Halseth, & Manson, 2008b; Scott, 2000). With the breakdown of these investment and equalization levers, new regionalism has been tracking the reconfiguration of both economic competitiveness and governance as expressed at the regional scale. Economically, new regionalism understands development as a socially embedded process where the social capital of a region may exert influence on economic performance (Argent, 2011; Barnes & Gertler, 1999; Cooke & Morgan, 1998). The governance theme is equally pronounced, as regions experiment with different institutional structures and relationships in an attempt to compensate for government withdrawal and innovate to establish better local participation, competitive advantage, and economies of scale (MacLeod, 2001; Scott, 2004; Shucksmith, 2009; Smyth, Reddel, & Jones, 2004; Storper, 1995; Uyarra, 2010). Governance approaches can offer innovative solutions to address state withdrawal and build regional capacity; however, they are equally challenged by the enhanced complexity associated with more open and varied participation (Peterson, Walker, Maher, Hoverman, & Eberhard, 2010). As such, governance is susceptible to tension, including issues of social inclusion and exclusion (Andrew & Doloreux, 2012).

The new regionalist literature is varied, ranging from the restructuring of global socio-political relations to the re-sorting of relations between the state, the economy, and civil society actors via the neoliberalization of public policy. Under the second, some have focused on a specific critique of how new regionalism is constructed within the economic project of globalization (Jones, 2009; Lovering, 1999, 2001) while others have focused on the application of regional economic structures to support innovation and development (Cooke 2001; Makkonen & Inkinen, 2014; Semian & Chromý, 2014; Suorsa, 2014).

In other forms, new regionalism explores the mechanical processes of small places ‘scaling-up’ to work more effectively as regions in both the public policy arena and the marketplace. Markey et al. (2012) and Heley (2013) focus on some of the community development imperatives and practicalities of small places scaling-up to work as regions within new governance relationships. Healey (1997, 2010) addresses the planning challenges embodied within new governance arrangements. With a focus upon places and quality of life, her ‘place-based’ approach to planning recognizes the uniqueness of locales and the constraints on those locales from the increasingly fast pace of change in the global economy, globalized society, and the environment. Others have focused on the more specifically on the question of governance, including Cheshire (2010; Cheshire, Everingham, & Lawrence, in press) and Morrison (2014; Morrison, Wilson, & Bell 2012).

A critical dimension of new regionalism is the use of a territorial rather than sectoral approach to policy and planning. First, a territorial planning model can allow for the integration of economic, environmental, social, and cultural dynamics (as articulated above) in planning at a manageable scale (Kitson, Martin, & Tyler, 2004). Second, a territorial approach recognizes the importance of a contextually specific process of development (Barnes et al., 2000; Markey et al., 2012). Rural development itself has struggled through, and for the most part, learned from the failures associated with top-down, uniform, non-participatory models of development (Barca, McCann, & Rodriguez-Pose, 2012; Booth & Halseth, 2011; Halseth & Booth, 2003).
Attention to territoriality is necessary to attain local buy-in and to benefit from local/regional knowledge, leadership, and development assets; it also supports economic growth at all levels (Farole, Rodriguez-Pose, & Storper, 2011). Finally, territorial planning models may reduce duplication and lead to more lasting policy interventions given their attention to contextual conditions (Bradford, 2005; Pezzini, 2001).

Key within the potential appeal of new regionalism is the ability to improve a region’s economic, social, or environmental situation through appropriate intervention (Polèse, 1999). As Barca et al. (2012, p. 149) note, “development policies [need to be] more capable to respond to today’s challenges, and thus, more effective and efficient than past intervention”. From this perspective, the region represents a manageable scale for understanding impacts and designing mitigation strategies. Porter’s (2004) study of the competitiveness of US rural regions, for example, identifies the importance of both inherited endowments (location, resources, etc.) and development choices and leadership, diverse in origin, in determining regional fortunes.

Our focus on new regionalism is embedded within the discourse on governance. In particular, we are interested in the ways that smaller places may scale-up their individual development efforts to work more effectively across the region (in this case sub-provincial) in both the public policy arena and the marketplace. This process requires a transition between older ‘government’ models to newer ‘governance’ mechanisms that value and enable regional initiative. Government oriented development models, in this case concerning rural development, are defined by institutional structures that are put in place to allow senior governments to directly deliver programs and services from the core to the hinterland. The decline of this regime necessitates a wider reliance upon community and regional initiative, as many of the social and economic issues that previously required or depended upon senior government support do not simply vanish because of a shift in favour of smaller senior governments. The crux of the issue then concerns the interconnected questions of (1) defining and delineating the redistributed roles concerning development issues, and (2) understanding where the authority (and capacity) resides to make decisions and implement them.

Returning specifically to the dynamics of our case study, the challenge in northern BC is that there is no particular history or experience with governance. Senior governments delivered programs to communities, which exist in legislative terms as creatures of the province, meaning they have limited regulatory powers that are given to them by the provincial government. At the inter-community level (i.e., communities within a region), the division of Fordist productive capacity effectively separated communities by virtue of their specific industrial character (e.g., mill-town, oil-town, pulp-town, fishing-town). Communities across rural and northern BC have no history of working together to address common economic, social, or environmental issues. Communities often joke that their only history of interaction concerns playing each other in hockey games—the outcome of which often left them less willing to work together. In less affable conditions, the relationship between Aboriginal communities and municipalities is even more complicated. In regulatory terms, First Nations exist as a federal responsibility, creating an added layer of jurisdictional complexity. This complexity is particularly acute in BC as First Nations seek to exert control over their traditional territories (the vast majority of which were not settled by historical treaties as in other parts of Canada). At the
community level, a history of institutionalized racism and oppression serves as a barrier to trust. In the following sections, we consider how communities in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region worked together, and with senior governments, within such structures in practice, and reveal some systematic and relational struggles that communities may face in the pursuit of new regionalist governance.

4.0 Regional Stressors and Responses: The Cariboo-Chilcotin Case Study

As noted above, the literature identifies how new regionalist structures are driven by both reactive (e.g., response to neoliberalism and other crises) and proactive (e.g., capacity building through collaboration) processes. The following section highlights some of these dynamics as they influenced the formation of regional development bodies in the Cariboo-Chilcotin.

On the reactive side, there have been a series of stresses that have been affecting the regional economy since the early 1980s. Ongoing economic restructuring within the resource economy sector includes the increasing competition from low cost production sites and a revaluing of resource extraction activities (Hayter, 2003). In response, the provincial government formed the Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) in 1992. This signaled a concerted effort at regional land use planning and coordination in rural regions affected by environmental and economic change. The CORE’s goal was to develop a provincial sustainability strategy through regional land use planning (British Columbia CORE, 1995). To achieve this, the CORE was to facilitate regional discussions with high levels of public participation in four regions (Owen, 1998). In the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process, 24 interest sectors came together to address land use in the region. Despite the intended opportunity, not all sectors were equally addressed in the discussions, and while the CORE had a statutory duty to encourage First Nation participation, respect their rights and treaty negotiations, and give their interests due consideration (British Columbia CORE, 1994), First Nation participation in the process was informal and limited. In the end, the table failed to achieve consensus and the land use decisions were made by provincial authorities (Cariboo Communities Coalition, 1995; McAllister, 1998).

There has also been significant political restructuring. This includes changes that derive from a transition towards a neoliberal policy agenda and the process of ‘off-loading’ activities to local governments with varying levels of support. A number of regionalist initiatives that have formed over the years to address issues in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (see Table 2). In each, public, private, and not-for-profit organizations came together to address the region’s future. To varying degrees, organizations planned for land use, economic, environmental, and social change.

Each initiative operated without direct government oversight. In each case, the regional group was working to influence regional, provincial, and federal policy as it pertained to the region, but ultimate decision-making remained with senior governments. These processes represent forms of governance as they involve the “interdependence of governmental and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges. [I]t is about governmental and non-governmental organizations working together” (Marsden & Murdoch, 1998, p. 1). The actions of these organizations in the governing of the Cariboo-Chilcotin are important as they sought “to influence government … perform what were once seen as the traditional tasks of formal government” (Goodwin, 1998, p. 8).
Table 2. Regional Planning Processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (1990 to Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Name</th>
<th>Abbreviated Name</th>
<th>Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission on Resources and Environment</td>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Jan 1992 - July 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Land Use Plan</td>
<td>C-CLUP</td>
<td>July 1994 - Oct 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Regional Resource Board</td>
<td>C-CRRB</td>
<td>April 1995 - Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition</td>
<td>C-CBAC</td>
<td>Feb 2005 - Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: British Columbia Commission on Resources and the Environment, 1994; C-CBAC, 2008; Cariboo Communities Coalition, 1995; Hilbert, 2003.

Political restructuring is also affected by the ongoing Aboriginal land claims and treaty talks taking place across the region. These talks have been underway in an active form for more than 16 years and yet no treaties have been settled in this territory (British Columbia Treaty Commission, 2011). Despite the failure to settle treaties, some groups such as the Tsilhqot’in National Government have enhanced their roles in land management, as well as economic and community development. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in *William v. British Columbia* granted title over large areas of land to the Tsilhqot’in First Nation. The decision affirmed that Aboriginal title not only includes land and resources, but that it is not restricted to site specific locations as previously assumed.

Finally, processes of social restructuring are also evident in the case region, including a number of demographic issues. Principal among those are general population aging commensurate with what is being experienced across the Canadian population. However, there is also the phenomena of resource frontier aging due to the large population of workers who came into the region with their young families in the 1960s and 1970s and, because of the process of economic change and restructuring, have essentially aged in place (Hanlon & Halseth, 2005).

4.1 The Mountain Pine Beetle

In addition to the host of economic, political, demographic, and social changes, the region is also adjusting to significant environmental changes. One of the most dramatic of these is the largest recorded infestation of mountain pine beetle (MPB) in North America. The MPB is a natural inhabitant of lodgepole pine forests, but populations have historically been contained by species mix of natural regeneration cycles and cold winter temperatures. The beetle inhabits pine trees by laying eggs under the bark. When the eggs hatch, the larvae mine the phloem layer beneath the bark and eventually cut off the tree’s supply of nutrients. The recent wide-scale infestation was enabled by industrial monoculture replantation practices and warmer winters attributed to climate change (British Columbia Ministry of Forests and Range, 2010; McGarrity & Hoberg, 2005).

The economic implications of the MPB infestation are devastating. Pine is the dominant species in the Cariboo-Chilcotin and that it is the primary input for the
regional forest industry. Outside of the more obvious forest industry impacts, there are a variety of other impacts, including landscape aesthetics, the likelihood and severity of forest fires, and a series of negative impacts on water quality, wildlife habitat, property values, and others. In the short-term, the MPB infestation caused an economic uplift through increased harvesting and subsequent production (Patriquin, Wellstead & White, 2007). Beginning in 2004, the allowable annual cut (AAC) for the 100 Mile House, Quesnel, and Williams Lake Timber Supply Areas (TSAs) was increased to compensate for the “limited time during which one can economically recover lumber from harvested logs” (British Columbia Ministry of Forests and Range, 2007, p. 2). However, the MPB infestation will ultimately result in a long-term economic decline as the amount of timber available for harvest significantly declines. The impact will be felt quickly as the AACs are expected to fall below pre-infestation levels in a relatively short time period. Government models suggest available timber will decrease by more than 78% (British Columbia Ministry of Forests, 2004). In a region dependent on forest industry employment, this will translate into mill closures and higher unemployment (C-CBAC, 2008). In July 2008, the region’s unemployment rate was 7.8%, while BC was 4.5%. By July 2009, the region’s unemployment rate had nearly doubled to 14.2%, while BC’s rate had increased to 6.9% (British Columbia Statistics, 2009).

In response to the MPB infestation, the provincial government created a MPB Action Plan in 2001 to help to coordinate MPB-affected interests and actors with a goal of sustaining the long-term economic well-being of impacted communities and the forest industry (British Columbia, 2006). The province has helped to facilitate community economic transition through investments in regional development trusts, beetle action coalitions, and other MPB recovery projects. Despite these investments, there are claims that the response has been overly biased towards the timber supply implications and “offered little information about mitigation and solutions across a broad range of potential economic sectors” (Forrex, 2006, p. 33).

### 4.2 Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition

In response to both the long-term restructuring in the forest industry, and the specific pressures of the MPB infestation through the region, communities across the Cariboo-Chilcotin advocated for proactive planning to create viable economic futures. When it became apparent that the provincial government did not have an operational plan in place to meet the challenges of the infestation and the needs of the communities, the communities themselves banded together in a new form of cooperative regional governance: a beetle action coalition. They supported the idea of working together collectively and approached the provincial government for base funding to assist in their operations. The provincial government was supportive of the idea and instructed the beetle action coalitions to devise regional development strategies that could inform provincial government investments.

Because of the extent of the MPB infestation, there was wide interest in this new form of regional development partnership. The C-CBAC was the first regional coalition to be formed. However, others were soon organized, including the Omineca Beetle Action Coalition and the Southern Interior Beetle Action Coalition (Figure 2). The geographic area that these coalitions cover demonstrates the extent of the MPB infestation, and its potential impact on the health of BC’s forest-based economy.
The C-CBAC’s mandate was to address the social and economic challenges of the MPB infestation. It was to do this by working in a community-to-community dialogue process and by forging community-to-senior government cooperation. The goal was to create a series of short- and long-term strategic plans for renewal. The desired outcome was to have resilient economies and sustainable communities.

C-CBAC’s founding members included leadership from municipal governments in 100 Mile House, Williams Lake, and Quesnel; economic development representatives; regional government; community members; organization representatives; and one First Nation representative (see Table 3). This structure was based, in part, on regional precedents. Local government and economic ‘sector’ representations had long been a common structure for roundtables associated with resource development planning (Halseth & Booth, 2003). One of the challenges the C-CBAC encountered in this governance structure was that it was relatively weak in terms of involving those outside of municipal government boundaries and completely lacking in any substantive First Nation involvement at the outset. Instead, as Davis & Reed (2013) argue, First Nation board representation in the C-CBAC was regarded as token, rather than meaningful, participation. A second challenge is that the board had no representation from provincial or federal levels of government despite press releases that suggested the beetle action coalition strategies could inform senior government investments and the provincial government’s Mountain Pine Beetle Action Plan. Instead, the role of senior levels
of governments was restricted to the provision of funding; although, the provincial government also provided some expertise through various ministers, deputy ministers, and members of the MPB Emergency Response Team 1.

Table 3. C-CBAC Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title/Representative</th>
<th>Participants February 2005</th>
<th>Participants October 2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal Mayor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cariboo Regional District Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Conservation Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cariboo Communities Coalition</td>
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<td>SHARE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cariboo Licensees Land Use Strategy Committee</td>
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Sources: 1C-CBAC, 2005c; 2C-CBAC, 2008.

To move forward with its strategic planning work, the C-CBAC organized a series of working groups. These covered three areas: economic development, social development, and long-term governance. In order to support policy development, the C-CBAC constructed its working groups to look at a series of structural issues. Collectively, these included the design framework for the recommended development strategies, an extensive process of community outreach and information sharing within the governance structure, the need to create a framework proposal for the provincial government to assist or to guide in the implementation of their recommendations, and to ensure that all of the components fit within a robust social development and economic development framework.

The work completed by the C-CBAC was impressive. They undertook strategy development in a host of sectors (see Figure 3). They also started initial work on strategy implementation. For example, they secured a grant from the provincial government to implement the worker adjustment programs suggested in their forest worker strategy to help with the adjustment of people being displaced by ongoing restructuring in the industry.

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1 The MPB Emergency Response Team is a team of representatives from eight provincial ministries responsible for coordinating a response to varied effects of the MPB epidemic (British Columbia Integrated Land Management Bureau (ILMB) 2007).
Finally, the C-CBAC pulled all of this work together into a framework for the future. The framework was presented to the provincial government in October 2008. The framework included a proposal for a Pine Beetle Trust Fund that would be significant enough to support ongoing activities by the governance coalition as it implemented change over the long-term. The second component was a detailed regional diversification plan based on the various sectors and strategies put forward.

The provincial government, however, has not acted on any recommendations contained in the final report. Moreover, the three successfully funded positions that stemmed from the C-CBAC’s preliminary recommendations were terminated after their initial one-year contract. As such, the C-CBAC process has not yet been able to achieve its mandate “to ensure that our communities are economically stable, that there are jobs in all sectors, and support the entrepreneurial spirit that is fundamental to the Cariboo-Chilcotin lifestyle” (C-CBAC, 2005, p.3). Provincial inactivity on the final report’s recommendations and the presently unfulfilled mandate suggest that the C-CBAC’s ‘bottom-up’ approach may not have been an effective alternative
to traditional regional approaches unless there is support from those controlling the ‘top-down’ public policy levers, something we will consider in the next section.

5.0 Innovative Governance and the Government Response: Successes and Challenges of the C-CBAC case

The C-CBAC case highlights successes and challenges of new regionalist initiatives in practice. Some of the C-CBAC’s successes include strengthening a regional collaboration framework in the face of economic, environmental and social stress and developing a regional diversification strategy. Some of the C-CBAC’s challenges relate to establishing a regional governance regime and the tepid, and ultimately top-down responses of senior governments.

5.1 Successes

It is important to note that the process of regional governance collaboration, as experimented within the C-CBAC, experienced a wide range of successes. As noted by Barnes and Hayter (1994), the struggle to achieve such successes should not be underestimated given the number of competing pressures and the stresses being felt across those different sectors.

First, building upon patterns of working together in previous land-use processes, the C-CBAC was successful in establishing a local framework for regional collaboration. They developed a set of regional development strategies and, over a number of years, worked effectively to put together a highly complex and nuanced regional diversification strategy. As one respondent reported, they became personally invested in the work they were doing together:

We built trust and relationships that have survived for years simply because of [previous land-use processes]. It put people together that would have otherwise never come to sit at the same table to work together for a common goal. That builds strong bridges and lasting relationships … people would become your friends. They are no longer a person who sits across the table – they are a friend. (Interview 40)

Further, regional action was taken. They created detailed strategic plans across nine economic sectors, accompanied by community development strategies in five social sectors. They also opened a forest worker adjustment office and implemented two years of programming and supports to transitioning workers. They implemented a partnered funding program for projects that supported sustainable regional economic, environmental, and social development that also involve regional co-operation and collaboration between First Nations, municipalities and regional districts, provincial and federal government, and the private sector. These successes speak to the opportunities that new regionalist initiatives present, particularly a territorial planning model whereby planning addresses economic, environmental, social and cultural dynamics. As Markey et al. (2012) note, this integrated and territorial approach ensures that development processes are specific to the context of place. As one participant noted, ‘‘Made in the Cariboo’ is a big phrase that you hear a lot’’ (Interview 24).
5.2 Challenges in Governance

Despite such successes, the C-CBAC faced challenges in its new regionalist governance approach. Internally, there were challenges with the governance process along many themes, including: public or community involvement, involvement of key actors, and broader communications. As Booth & Halseth (2011) note, territorial planning requires local buy-in. However, as the C-CBAC case highlights, regional governance processes may also work against buy-in.

In order to develop an innovative organization to respond to the lack of provincial or federal planning or action with respect to the MPB epidemic, the C-CBAC drew upon the social capital from previous regional processes to mobilize quickly. In this, the C-CBAC is representative of institutional structures that are required in new regionalism (Argent, 2011). However, particularly in rural regions where capacity is invested in individuals, such institutional structures are deeply embedded in existing networks. In the C-CBAC case, as a result of their drawing on existing networks, there was confusion and angst about how representative the ‘community group’ was in practice. As one participant indicates:

They self-identified. I do not understand how a community-based entity can determine its own membership and then close that membership to anyone else who wants to participate. … The unions wanted to be involved, but they were told that they could be on an advisory group. The business community wanted to be on it, but they were also told that they could be on the advisory group. I question who they are to determine who has the rights of decision-making on the Board and who is relegated to the advisory group? (Interview 20)

In addition to concerns about broad ‘community’ involvement, there were also concerns voiced about ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ to the process and calls for more general public involvement. These issues created concerns about the role of local politics and alliances, as two participants noted:

This Board became very susceptible to partisan thinking. This was a dysfunction that grew as the coalition evolved. It has impacted our effectiveness because, when it came time to make difficult choices, they had already drawn lines in the sand about who would support who because of the politics. (Interview 26)

I think that those who are engaged and involved feel that the process is working. They feel that they are doing the consultation and that they are doing the work. They do not understand why there is mistrust because they are engaged and involved. (Interview 29)

And finally, it was expressed that the lack of broader involvement hindered the sense of success by those who were not involved. As one participant notes:

People who are at that leadership level understand the planning process that has taken place, understand what is in place now, and understand that now is the time to start the implementation. I think that the average citizen is very concerned that they do not see any action happening. … they do not see it because they have not been involved in the process. They are out in left field somewhere. (Interview 10)
In addition to the concerns about broader public or community involvement, concerns were expressed about the (non-)involvement of key regional actors. Specifically, those who were in the region’s periphery (geographically removed from the primary North-South transportation corridor) were not systematically invited to be members of the Board, despite that the mayors from all other municipalities in the CRD were invited. Another critically important set of regional actors that had limited participation were First Nation representatives from across the region. As one participant notes:

There was a big kafuffle about First Nations not being represented on the Board and the provincial government made a stipulation that they had to resolve that issue for any further money. (Interview 20)

However, interviewees did highlight how attempts were made to include First Nation representatives: “They made an honest attempt to include Aboriginal voices, though I do not think that they were particularly successful” (Interview 17).

The final internal challenge with the governance process in the C-CBAC concerns broader communications by the group. The failure to maintain routine communications affected involvement and feelings of (dis)connectedness. As one participant notes:

I do not hear anything about it anymore. There is no longer a C-CBAC newsletter. … I do not hear of any steps forward … So, it becomes another one of these ‘yay, the region got together and we talked again about all of our complaints and all of our issues, but nothing was done again.’ That is frustrating. (Interview 18)

The group’s failure to communicate adequately was also recognized by the ‘insiders’ of the C-CBAC:

I think that the biggest thing that we did not do properly initially was our communications. We did not reach out far enough, soon enough and we paid for that over the first year. We did not reach out to the community at large … We kind of played the inside game at first. (Interview 44)

Ultimately, the structure and management of the governance model proved to be a challenge in the C-CBAC case. While the literature suggests that the localization of power addresses some of the challenges associated with more ‘top-down’ regional development approaches (Bradshaw, 2003), the more open and varied participation highlights the potential for governance processes to manifest as socially complex processes (Peterson et al., 2010).

5.3 Challenges in Government

Aside from the internal challenges of participation and representation, the most significant problem for the success of the C-CBAC initiative was when ‘governance’ encountered ‘government.’ Many of the governance challenges experienced by the C-CBAC can be attributed to being a new initiative with limited capacity given the scale of their intended mandate. Despite all the years of planning and activity, and the foundations for cooperation that the C-CBAC had built, old mechanisms of government trumped the regional governance potential.
Critical here are two elements. First, senior levels of government continued to operate through traditional government structures. They continued to liaise with local government in traditional (legislated and non-legislated) ways. In particular, all of their programs, services, and supports are generally geared to run through local government structures. This is a product of the long-run need for accountability and line decision-making. However, such an approach does not accommodate regional governance groups.

The C-CBAC case illustrates how senior governments struggle with the need for more contextually or place-based policy and program responses (Peterson et al., 2010). While place-based responses may be configured support a neoliberal strategy in terms of reduced senior government responsibility (Tonts & Haslam-McKenzie, 2005), the struggle arises in what roles senior government then play (Polèse, 1999). Formation of the C-CBAC presented a challenge to the BC provincial government, as one participant noted:

[C-CBAC] got started by what the government was not doing. … When we went to the Ministry of Economic Development and asked what they were going to do about the MPB, their response was for us to wait until it happens and then come back to ask for help. It only took a couple of phone calls to … [determine] that this was an unsatisfactory answer. … They were not able or prepared to think about the MPB in the same way that forest-dependent communities are able and prepared to. (Interview 26)

Thus, while the formation of the C-CBAC was potentially fulfilling the government’s overall strategy of state downsizing and placing greater emphasis on the local, they were puzzled in terms of how best to work with these new structures.

The C-CBAC case also highlights the challenges of implementing territorial planning. As one participant commented, there was a logic to territorial planning being led by those in the region:

There must have been some recognition by the provincial government that they were not as equipped to handle economic development in our communities as we were. That is a shift in decision-making. (Interview 10)

However, this potential was stunted because of a loss of, and no substitution for, top-down support such as access to budgets and the policy levers to affect change. For example, despite the region’s over $1 billion annual contribution to the provincial economy (Davis & Reed, 2013), the C-CBAC has not been able to secure a re-investment of long-term, stable funding to implement their strategies.

The C-CBAC case demonstrates, while senior governments devolved some mandate for regional planning, they did not devolve decision-making or budgetary authority. Further, they may ‘off-load’ activity but they are still held accountable for outcomes and the overall outcomes of the policy. As one participant observed:

The government can say [in the end] ‘it was not us who screwed this up.’ The ministers that I talked to were keenly aware that one of the advantages of giving everything to a group is that there is some deniability, but it is a double-edged sword because the government will still be blamed. … they are going to take a hit if we do something really stupid. (Interview 23)
There was a clear tension between a desire on behalf of senior governments to ‘off-load’ activities and responsibilities while still being held accountable to and for regionalist outcomes. This struggle is new for senior governments and requires a deviation from traditional government responses, as highlighted below.

The C-CBAC case also highlights a second ‘government’ challenge related to regional governance, specifically as it pertains to traditional government responses on behalf of local and senior governments. Regional governance literature supports the need for regions to be innovative to address ongoing challenges and take advantage of opportunities (Shucksmith, 2009; Uyarra, 2010). However, for new regionalist initiatives to be successful, all levels of traditional governments must innovate in how they address challenges. The C-CBAC case highlights where local governments and senior governments reverted to traditional responses for the delivery of funding supports.

Local governments themselves are tied to very distinct sets of pressures associated with structure. Key among these is that residents within their jurisdictional boundaries elect local councils and local mayors. Municipal politicians are not necessarily elected to think and act regionally. To work across jurisdictional boundaries and to bring supports and benefits that may go to other communities simply opens local elected representatives to criticism on why they are not watching out for their community. For example, one participant commented:

> There is a lot of mistrust and old history. … Friction continues from events that happened ten years ago between long-time electoral area CRD directors and councilors from [this municipality] who have served for a long time. This is where there is mistrust. (Interview 06)

And, as raised by another participant identifying the importance of context and difference:

> The idea that you can take very different and distinct urban centres, especially in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, and come up with a regional economic development model that makes sense for all of them and not have it fall into turf protection [would be very difficult]. Williams Lake, 100 Mile House, and Quesnel are very different from each other in their make-up, their psyche, their old boys’ networks, and how the communities are run. (Interview 20)

As a reflection of the corrosive impacts of ‘government’ on ‘governance,’ these two government realities came together and became most apparent when the federal government initiated a program called the Community Economic Development Initiative (CEDI). The program ran through standard federal government delivery mechanisms, representing the federal response to the MPB outbreak. A call for proposals was made, and these were invited from local governments across BC. Since local governments were the ones being asked to apply, each of the mayors effectively abandoned the C-CBAC and instead chose to focus on their own jurisdiction, as one participant notes: “I get paid by the residents in this city and I have an obligation that I do my best to ensure financial stability and that I protect our tax base … My counterpart in [another city], that is [their] role” (Interview 12).
The effect was immediate:

> Everything was going on in our area regionally was basically dropped… 
> [W]e had spent two and a half years getting communities to collaborate….and not be in competition….for provincial and federal funds. 
> In a week, [the federal CEDI] destroyed that whole two and a half years’ worth of work without even knowing it. (Interview 26)

In the regional development literature, Polèse (1999) calls for appropriate intervention on behalf of governments. The C-CBAC case highlights that appropriate intervention requires innovative government responses to new regionalist governance initiatives, particularly where elections, jurisdictional boundaries, and funding supports are concerned. The transition towards neoliberal policies creates space for new regionalist innovation. New regionalism requires new and innovative government roles and responses, not just devolution.

### 6.0 Conclusion: Implications for (New) Regions

The C-CBAC is a regional development strategy that comprises many of the new regionalist principles. The coalition’s formation follows the dominant trends of devolution associated with both neoliberal off-loading and more proactive responses to mobilize local capacity and support development activities. Moreover, the governance structure of the C-CBAC and their inclusion of the local public, private, and not-for-profit sectors, is representative of contemporary regional development decision-making, as explained in the new regionalism literatures (Li & Wu, 2012; MacLeod, 2001; Wallis, 1994). However, the C-CBAC has not been effective in achieving their goals of regional development. The C-BAC case highlights a series of internal governance- and external government-oriented reasons for this failure. The current structure feigns co-construction, but internal challenges were then further constrained and exacerbated by central governments retaining control and reverting to traditional top-down mechanisms to fund mitigation and transition responses.

The MPB infestation provided a crisis around which local residents could rally. Most participants felt that the MPB infestation was the primary factor contributing to the C-CBAC’s formation. However, the MPB infestation alone did not result in the C-CBAC. The region’s history of working together facilitated the organization’s initial formation. A small group of regional decision-makers, familiar to working with one another in regional development decision-making, came together to meet about the MPB infestation. As such, existing networks and trust facilitated the C-CBAC’s formation. However, the relatively small and closed nature of participation has worked to limit the development of the C-CBAC Board beyond its initial membership (Davis & Reed, 2013). The strong trust among a small group helped but also hindered the Board’s development. As a regionalist structure, the C-CBAC was not able to attain wider regional buy-in and support.

The transition towards neoliberal policies also helped to facilitate the C-CBAC’s formation. As the provincial government ‘rolled-back’ its involvement in BC’s rural regional development initiatives, the space was created for the C-CBAC to address these issues. Conversely, neoliberal policies hindered the C-CBAC because jurisdiction, authority, and budget control were not provided to the C-CBAC for plan implementation. Traditional government structures assumed (or retained) ultimate authority and decision-making power.
The C-CBAC case demonstrates some of the successes and struggles that regions may be faced with in the practice of collaboration, innovation, and governance as they try to apply and exercise new regionalist practices. Specifically, this case study highlights that the transition to new regionalist governance is a process that is not isolated from other political, economic, and environmental pressures.

In the transition from top-down regional development supports to a more collaborative approach, the C-CBAC case highlights a number of struggles. Hierarchical government processes and the perceived need to protect a local economy undermined the transition towards governance. As in the C-CBAC case, regional development governance structures are challenged with the need for continued top-down support (access to decision-making, policy and resources). If those top-down supports are not delivered in a way that recognizes autonomy or jurisdiction of the regionalist structure, then they cannot achieve all of their desired goals. In the C-CBAC case, senior levels of government retained power and appeared unwilling to change; their governance mechanisms were embedded in traditional hierarchical, government structures. As a result, in the end, regional collaboration was replaced with jurisdictional competition.

Many of the challenges with new regionalist governance structures, as demonstrated by the C-CBAC in practice, are discussed in other studies (Lovering, 1999; MacKinnon, Cumbers, & Chapman, 2002; Sancton, 2001). However, effective regional governance and appropriate supports are pivotal for place-based economies and place-based policy (Argent et al., 2010; Barca et al., 2012; Bradford, 2005). Lessons continue to be learned from case studies like this one, but more case studies are required to better understand the complexities of new regionalist arrangements and the challenges and potential transferability of lessons learned.

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